New Mexico Historical Review
Volume 57

Number 3

Article 5

7-1-1982

Mexican Immigration and Border Strategy During the Revolution,
1910–1920
Douglas W. Richmond

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation
Richmond, Douglas W.. "Mexican Immigration and Border Strategy During the Revolution, 1910–1920."
New Mexico Historical Review 57, 3 (1982). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol57/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

MEXICAN IMMIGRATION AND BORDER STRATEGY
DURING THE REVOLUTION, 1910-1920

DOUGLAS W. RICHMOND'

a variety of rivals by 1915, Venustiano Carranza
established a nationalist government that confronted Woodrow Wilson and the United States. Many ofthe resulting conflicts originated
along the U.S.-Mexican border because life in that area became
violent. The uncertain status of Mexican braceros and immigrants
became important issues for both governments, especially when
Carranza decided to remedy the plight of Mexican immigrants and
to' organize them as his allies. Political strategies and the economies
of both countries depended upon successful resolution of these
border disputes.
Mexico's most important political change, the Revolution of 1910
to 1920, naturally dominated these years. Beginning with the efforts
of Ricardo and Enrique Flores Mag6n to organize armed resistance
and working class solidarity against the governments of Porfirio
Diaz and Francisco Madero, anarchosyndicalism became one of
the radical manifestations of a social revolution affecting the border
after 1910. Border issues such as radical dissent were complex
because, though originating within the region, they had noticeable
impacl on Washington, D.C. and Mexico City.
- To deal with these border problems, the Mexican government
requested permission from the United States to send Mexican troops
across the United States side of the border to defeat radicals. Because areas such as Baja California were inaccessible and traditional
regions of filibuster activity and these requests vital to the security
of any regime, the United States usually cooperated because many
of the Mexican anarchosyndicalists had Mexican-American adherents in Los Angeles, Texas, and throughout the Southwest. 1 Both
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governments tried to keep the border free of leftist dissidents who
might aid the growth of the Industrial Workers of the World or the
Magonistas.
Once Woodrow Wilson and Carranza assumed power, however,
national strategies along the border became warlike. Wilson sought
any pretext to remove Huerta, threatening him with armed intervention if he could not control and defeat the "vandalism" caused
by the Villista and Carrancista groups. 2 After the U. S. invasion of
Veracruz in 1914, Huerta tried to unify the nation hehind him and
put aside the differences the civil war had caused. But the Constitutionalist forces of Carranza ignored Huerta's demands that they
battle together against occupation forces at Veracruz. 3 A few months
later, Huerta fled the country and within two years died in exile.
During his career as rebel and constitutional president, Carranza
carefully considered the political complexities of the border. He
established several sympathetic newspapers on both sides of the
border with Constitutionalist propagandizers campaigning effectively in several border towns and collecting large amounts offunds.
In addition, several juntas constitucionalistas recruited men and
found supplies for Carranza during his various struggles. The average border inhabitant, however, suffered greatly when revolutionary forces seized food, horses, and other goods. It was not
always a comfort to know that enemies of Carranza would have
their land taken away. Although the seized lands were returned by
1917, the years of violence meant insecurity and fear. 4
Carranza's desire for a secure border often motivated his diplomacy concerning the U.S.-Mexican boundary. Obtaining de facto
recognition was a major task. Some Mexican generals went to the
extreme of offering to cross the border and to raise the Mexican
flag in order to obtain the desired result. 5 After Wilson relented
and recognized the Carranza government, both governments avoided
war but sought to protect their interests. Agreements for pursuit
of bandits on both sides of the border personified this spirit, and
working class organizations pressured Carranza and Wilson to settle
their differences peacefully.6 In the meantime, Carranza decided
to control his side of the border. Whenever possible, he exiled
priests and other dissidents, and when Mexican authorities turned
over to American officials a Mexican national 'accused of theft, Car-
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ranza had the careless subordinate shot. 7 Incidents involving national honor were paramount to Carranza.
Carranza's diplomatic triumphs established the precedent of a
nationalist foreign policy that enabled future Mexican governments
to protect Mexico's economic and political interests. Carranza was
more bold than any other leader of the Mexican Revolution in
resisting the intervention of the Wilson regime. For this stance,
he received widespread support from all classes when he opposed
U. S. imperialism. 8 Because Wilson and Carranza were determined
to implement their plans, the frontera norte became the scene of
bitter conflicts.
Carranza's most dramatic innovations were his policy of protecting Mexico's natural resources and his imposing state regulations on most economic activity. As early as 1914, Carranza tripled
the oil production tax. He also suspended the construction of new
oil fields in January 1915 and decreed that oil companies must
submit detailed plans to his officials for their approval. 9 In addition
to securing massive revenue from the oil fields, Carranza asserted
Mexican ownership of subsoil wealth in other foreign-owned sectors
of the economy. In September 1916, Carranza ordered foreign and
national mineowners to renew full-time operations or face expropriation. 1o Like the oil companies, mineowners such as the Guggenheims had to pay sharply increased taxes in oro nacional (gold
currency). 11
Carranza also began attacking foreign control of the nation's land.
A decree in June 1916 ruled that foreign capitalists had to renounce
external citizenship, promise formally to abide by Mexican law,
and recognize that the Carranza regime could intervene into any
matter involving foreign-owned lands. Carranza also barred foreigners from buying land in the federal district and various st~tes
throughout the country. In addition, the government revoked many
of the colonization contracts the Diaz regime had granted. Most
of the land concessions involved border areas capitalized by development companies from the western United States. 12
Unfortunately, wartime conditions and the clash between Wilson
and Carranza over the exploitation of Mexico's natural wealth slowed
the revival of the border economy. North American companies
generally opposed the enormous tax increases Carranza imposed.
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To pressure him into retreating, they delayed renewing operation
of their plants. Shortages of coal and oil also endangered the recovery of various industries, particularly in the mining sector. Another debilitating component of border economic problems was
inflation. Until financial stability asserted itself in 1917, the border
suffered from counterfeiters and a flood of new currency. 13
Despite Carranza's new economic policies, northern Mexico continued to depend upon border trade with the United States. This
relationship was not always beneficial, particularly when U. S. officials adversely affected the frontera norte's commercial traffic by
suspending trade across the border. 14 Another persistent border
irritant was the problem of contraband. Anxious to protect her
industry even during the Revolution, Mexico erected tariff walls
to restrict the entry of many U. S. goods, but smuggling satisfied
demands for North American products despite plans to stamp out
illegal border trade. This conflict was particularly difficult for Carranza because he would not permit Mexican agricultural exports
in order to feed a hungry population. Although Carranza was successful in regulating foreign economic activity, U. S. and British
wealth in Mexico increased during the Revolution. 15 Moreover,
massive migration of Mexicans into the United States from 1916 to
1920 illustrates the economic problems that Mexico suffered during
that era.
Mexican emigration to the north had begun even before the
United States was a nation. First, Spanish conquistadors conquered
what is now Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California, but when
Mexico lost possession of Texas in 1836 and the Southwest in 1848,
many Mexicans remained to become U.S. citizens. Some assumed
positions of power and influence, but more were treated as a conquered group by subsequent waves of Anglos from the east and
north. The first real Mexican migrations began with the building
of railroads across the Southwest. The railroads provided transportation and jobs for the new Mexican immigrants, dispersing
them through shanty towns in Arizona and New Mexico, to California farms, and into Texas mines. Soon they became the premier
agricultural workers throughout the Southwest and spread into
factories of the Midwest. By 1900, an estimated 100,000 Mexicans
were living in the United States. 16
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The first U.S. restrictions upon Mexican immigration evolved
during the early years of the Revolution. Until the creation of the
Border Patrol in 1924, only about sixty mounted agents patrolled
the 1900-mile border. Lax border control enabled the immigrants
to cross the frontera norte with ease until anarchists caused concern. Because Mexican radicals cooperated with the Western Federation of Miners and received aid from militant labor leaders in
the United States, the first U.S. restrictions placed upon Mexican
immigration in 1903 were designed to check the entry of anarchists.
Most of the Mexican anarchists. were young, politically aware immigrants who had a profound impact upon Mexican-American communities. These activists tried to prepare the communities for
revolution in Mexico and organized strikes in a number of areas. 17
While keeping in mind opposition against him in the United
States and socioeconomic changes in Mexico, Carranza carefully
assessed the role of Mexicans along the border. Mexican immigrants
were a major factor in Carranza's policy of curtailing U.S. intervention. The humanitarian impulse of the Mexican Revolution,
whose egalitarianism proclaimed protection of oppressed peoples
from the strong powers, was another major factor. Carranza responded to border Mexicans and their needs as if they lived in
Mexico.
The immigration of Mexican laborers across the border was a
painful episode in Mexican and U.S. history. Carranza had witnessed the traumatic conditions of these generally poor people
when in exile in San Antonio. Bad treatment of the immigrants
angered Carranza early in his career, and he was determined to
improve the situation. 18 As violence increased after 1911, whole
villages fled across the border. As is the case today, the refugees
were looking for work often not available in Mexico. Sleeping on
the streets of Eagle Pass and other border cities, the immigrants
frequently subsisted on little more than coffee and crackers. (Those .
not searching for jobs were usually the families of various factional
groups fighting in Mexico.) Without shoes and dressed in rags,
these refugees elicited sympathy from Mexican as well as North
American officials. 19
Carranza opposed emigration because the flight of Mexican workers disrupted economic recovery when labor became scarce. In
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Fred R. Wulff, U. S. mine owner, with two peons near Torreon. Courtesy of Alice
W. McCart.

Mexican revolutionaries led by Jose Ines Salazar in action near the border.
Courtesy of Alice W. McCart.
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addition to the large numbers who crossed the border, many Mexican workers moved throughout northern Mexico from one area to
another in search of jobs. The attitude of Mexican governors along
the border matched that of the chief executive. Their apprehension
about the loss of agricultural workers convinced Carranza to take
action. 20 In March 1918, he prohibited the issuing of passports to
Mexican workers attempting to find employment across the border. 21
Carranza's nationalist border policy also included attempts to
protect Mexican braceros who found work in the United States.
By January 1917, the Secretaria de Gobernaci6n informed emigration officials that no Mexican laborers could leave the nation
unless they had a contract outlining hours of work and compensation. 22 Carranza also used his consuls to intervene in the making
of contracts so that Mexican workers would have decent conditions
outlined and enforced. When a strike of Mexican workers in Clifton,
Arizona, threatened to explode into violence, Carranza answered
the Arizona governor's appeal for aid; he sent his best consul to
arbitrate differences, and as a result the workers secured wage
increases. 23 Carranza's early concern for their welfare did not go
unnoticed among Mexican immigrants. By 1915, many of them
continued to support Carranza, despite propaganda campaigns by
conservative and Catholic refugees attacking the president. 24
Meanwhile, diplomatic conflict with the Wilson government provoked th~ first comprehensive United States restrictions against
Mexican immigration. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917
insisted that all aliens be literate and pay an eight dollar head tax.
Wilson, however, overlooked the fact that the World War I created
a new labor demand, which made this legislation meaningless.
Under pressure from growers, Wilson lifted the restriction in May
but imposed a six-month residence period for braceros, forced them
to carry identification cards, and threatened deportation for those
attempting to work in nonagricultural jobs. In addition, state governments were supposed to establish housing and sanitation standards. To discourage the Mexicans from becoming U.S. citizens,
growers withheld the workers' wages at discounted rates of ten to
twenty percent each month. These wages were deposited in the
U. S. Postal Savings Bank until the braceros returned to their place
of departure in Mexico. 25
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For the first time, a Mexican government actively demanded
that workers who migrated to the Southwest be treated fairly. In
doing so, Carranza frustrated the work oflabor recruiters searching
for bracero workers in Mexico. Despite the arguments of U. S.
Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher and the Labor Department, Carranza pointed out that working conditions were unsatisfactory and
that southwestern growers never fulfilled their contracts. Mexico
made it clear that only if the U.S. federal government would cooperate in ending bad labor conditions and heed the complaints of
the braceros could they expect to receive unlimited Mexican labor. 26 But the State Department considered "inexpedient" an agreement with Carranza on uniform regulations and reciprocal border
permits. 27
Still unresolved, these problems continue to plague relations
between both nations. But in the past, the list of complaints was
much longer. The Mexican foreign relations ministry protested the
conscription of Mexican citizens into the U. S. army and their use
as strikebreakers. Then, as now, coyotes promised good employment to Mexican workers but often abandoned them along la &ontera norte. Despite formidable objections from the Carranza
government, its workers continued to toil in humiliating circumstances. 28 Carranza, his governors, and Mexican consuls restricted
immigration to protest poor living conditions and endemic racism
that Mexicans often encountered in their new surroundings along
the border. 29
Carranza also attempted to aid those whose fortunes in the United
States declined. Under the pressure ofliving without their families,
several Mexican immigrants went insane, whereupon North American officials usually jailed and deported them. 30 When high wartime salaries in the U.S. ended, many immigrants did not find the
work that they sought. From 1915 to 1919, hundreds of braceros
returned to Saltillo, Piedras Negras, and Ciudad Juarez. The Carrancistas became concerned about their suffering because many
lacked funds to purchase train tickets to return home. 31 Thousands
of Mexicans stranded along the border and out of work accepted
Carranza's offer of free transportation. Carranza telegraphed each
governor and secured work for braceros in states such as Oaxaca,
Morelos, Campeche, Yucatan, and Michoacan. 32 Carranza also
sent hundreds of dollars for the relief of refugees near Eagle Pass. 33
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Various generals and governors provided unsuccessful immigrants
with land seized from Carranza's wealthy opponents and urged
Carranza to expand this policy. 34
Residents of the United States never welcomed the immigrants
with open arms. From 1918 to 1920, the Wilson government feared
that Carranza would encourage rebellion within the United States,
and many Southwesterners believed that Mexican refugees would
sow revolutionary ideas among minorities and labor organizations.
U.S. border patrols often had orders to stop anyone crossing the
line and frequently shot Mexicans who tried to ford the rivers or
boundaries. The arrival of Mexican army reinforcements in 1918
temporarily halted these flagrant abuses and death-dealing U.S.
raids across the border. 35
Social conditions in various Mexican border cities were strikingly
similar to problems of today. The turbulence of the Revolution
forced cities such as Ciudad Juarez to request funds for public
works projects such as streets and slaughterhouses. 36 Because the
Rio Grande cut off Mexican territory eventually claimed by the
United States, a Chihuahua deputy asked Carranza for 100,000
pesos to reconstruct defensive fortifications in front of Ciudad Juarez.
The dispute over this land, known as the Chamizal problem, would
fester for several decades until the United States returned the land
to Mexico in 1964. 37
Still, morale in the border cities remained higher than many
Carrancista authorities expected. Residents of Piedras Negras appealed to Carranza when their Jefe de Armas opened up a Gran
Jugada as a source of municipal revenue. They argued that this
gathering place resulted in "ruin and shame" because thirsty gringo
visitors showed up to drink excessively in cantinas and encourage
cockfights. 38 Physical security was another problem for border towns.
In some areas, municipal police had to be called on to battle bandits, Villistas, and U.S. soldiers who crossed the border to hunt
down Mexican raiders. During these armed conflicts many Mexican
citizens in border areas lost their lives. 39
In North American cities, Mexican consuls actively protested
numerous abuses that Mexican refugees suffered. Humiliated by
unemployment, discrimination, unofficial segregation, Texas rangers, and vicious lynchings, immigrants on the border and most

Mexican braceros constructing the Trasquila dam in northern Mexico. Courtesy
of Alice W. McCart.
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Mexican-Americans found life very difficult. Living conditions were
uniformly bad. In Laredo and most other Texas towns, Mexicans
and their children experienced segregation in public facilities. 40
Sympathetic to the plight of the immigrants and eager to promote
their interests, Carranza ordered his consuls in border cities to
demand that Mexicans receive fair treatment. For example, officials
such as F. J. Stafka protested films in Tucson that depicted Mexican
soldiers abusing U. S. citizens and their children. Consuls also protested the indifference of U. S. customs officials to the suffering of
refugees in areas such as Douglas, Arizona. 41
This intervention of consuls into the lives of Mexican nationals
was a historical departure from the pre-Revolution days when the
plight of immigrants was not considered a serious matter. These
new actions of Mexican diplomats brought mixed responses. Mexican residents in U.S. border cities often praised or condemned
the efforts of these officials. Some urged armed resistance to the
Wilson government or cited specific abuses needing to be corrected. Not all refugees, however, were poor. Some of them plotted
against the Carranza government with the aid of North American
investors who would have prospered if Carranza's economic reforms
ended. 42
As working class life began to improve, the generally militant
labor movement managed to reach some accommodation with .the
new regime in Mexico City. A principal cause of the Revolution
was the resentment that workers harbored against foreign investors. Before Carranza came to power, mine workers demanded that
the federal government no longer permit foreigners to exploit them. 43
The proletariat emerging from the mines became so militant that
they often threatened to lynch brutal foremen, even after judges
absolved these supervisors of any crimes. 44 Once Carranza became
the executive, Carrancistas listened carefully to working class demands, and state governments along the border negotiated with
strikers before calling in troops to restore order. In Coahuila, the
governor requested more rail traffic from the federal government
to mitigate the effects of local layoffs. 45 Generally speaking, Carranza and his governors preferred a paternalistic relation with labor
in which they attempted to check revolutionary protests with mild
reformism or repression.
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Despite continued attempts to eradicate them, vice and corruption maintained their sturdy tradition along the border. Some of
Carranza's officials, often intoxicated in various bars or found guilty
of fraud, left something to be desired. Many authorities could not
resist the juicy bribes forthcoming from the increased traffic in
drugs, alcohol, and prostitution in the frontier towns. The vice
trade increased noticeably after prohibition became the law in the
United States, with drugs and crime becoming a way of life. The
governor of Baja California was so corrupt that he operated an
opium business in conjunction with Chinese merchants. He used
his hypodermic needle so often that one leg and one arm were
partially black and covered with ugly perforations. 46
In addition to these problems, border clashes between the Mexican and United States military were as frequent as they were
serious. Earlier, Mexican raids upon Texas ranchers provoked general tension, and the constant incursions of U. S. soldiers also contributed to a growing xenophobia along the frontera norte as Mexican
citizens often fought them with the aid of federal troops. In several
cases, U.S. soldiers fired upon Mexican citizens and soldiers merely
for approaching the linea divisoria. These incidents often resulted
from the illegal passage of contraband supplies to anti-Carranza
rebels. On other occasions, many border residents drew rifle fire
when they tried to avoid paying customs taxes. Carranza was particularly angry when he learned that the head of the Texas Rangers
aided conservative dissidents who attacked Mexico from Texas. 47
Lengthy presidential addresses in 1918 and 1919 indicate that these
animosities left a lasting rancor that still has not entirely disappeared.
The degree of support that Carranza received in opposing the
Pershing expedition of 1916 illustrates the growth of Mexican nationalism along the border. Carranza protested strongly against the
Pershing attack; at one point he ordered his generals to fight if
Pershing advanced farther south. Wilson attempted to use the withdrawal of the Pershing column by demanding that Carranza alter
his policies concerning foreign capital, but Carranza refused. 48 All
classes of border people sent Carranza emotional letters of support
and participated in popular demonstrations. The masses also requested weapons and military instruction. Essentially, they con-
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sidered armed intervention an intolerable attack on the national
sovereignty. These reactions reveal an attitude of solidarity, determination, and collective unity absent during the war of 1846 to
1848. 49
Even more interesting is the backing that Carranza received from
Mexicanos who resided in the Southwest. Recent immigrants were
determinedly loyal to Mexico. Given the growing unrest that appeared in southwestern cities after Pershing crossed the border,
many U. S. officials feared a Mexican revolt in support of Carranza. 50
This factor, along with an increasingly dangerous situation in Europe, may have prevented an even larger army from being sent
into northern Mexico.
Another event that strengthened the Carranza government was
the victory of the army, now a totally new group of volunteers, at
the battle of Carrizal. This triumph gave officers enormous prestige
and confidence. According to a British journalist, the tough attitude
of Gen. Jacinto B. TreviflO against the arrogant Pershing and Trevino's strategy during the battle were factors in forcing the invaders
to withdraw. 51 Carranza himself was prepared to initiate total warfare if such a measure were necessary to oust the North American.
troops. Much of the tension was dissipated when Gen. Alvaro Obregon entered into negotiations with Gen. Hugh Scott in EI Paso
for the removal of the Pershing expedition. Since the army was
the most important institution in Mexico, its increased stature was
a definite factor in border diplomacy. 52
Another feature of the border, the growing dissatisfaction of Mexican-American communities in the U. S., is evident in a serious
Mexican revolt in Texas. The Plan de San Diego began with a call
for blacks and native Americans to join Mexicans in seizing parts
of the Southwest and expelling the Anglo majority. Written in jail
by Huerta officers in 1914, the plan was predicated upon Mexican
and immigrant needs. Huerta authorities counted on the support
of blacks on the border to aid them in case Wilson decided to
mount an all-out invasion of Mexico. 53
In October 1915, the revolt began with the obvious support of
the Carranza government. It was the most aggressive action taken
by any Mexican regime since the times of Antonio Lopez de Santa
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and had to recruit volunteers, National Guardsmen, and Texas
Rangers because the bloody uprising eventually claimed hundreds
of lives. Carranza probably fomented the uprising to secure de
facto diplomatic recognition and to use the conflict as a lever to
begin negotiations for the withdrawal of the Pershing forces. 55
Before it ended, the revolt became a serious affair. In June 1916,
Gen. Juan Antonio Acosta boasted to Gen. Pablo Gonzalez that
"the revolution in Texas is assuming serious proportions and the
gringos are very scared. "56 Although this assertion is somewhat
exaggerated, violence did shake south Texas all along the border.
Many Anglos feared that a race war would soon break out if local
Mexicans joined the revolt. But once Carranza received diplomatic
recognition and the Pershing expedition departed, he had achieved
his objectives, and he kept the leaders out of Texas, terminating
support for further armed unrest until 1919. 57 Not since the days
of Juan Cortina had the Mexicanos decided upon a violent revolt
to overturn a system that did little to satisfY their socioeconomic
needs.
Clearly, then, Mexican border policy represented changes the
Revolution had unleashed. The decision to oppose U.S. intervention strengthened the Carranza government; nationalism arose to
new heights, and confidence in the government grew despite a
time of economic deprivation. Although Carranza established the
precedent of state regulation of the nation's wealth, foreign ownership of wealth increased to the point that U.S. and British interests were more active in the structure of the Mexican economy
by 1920 than in 1910. Carranza was probably willing to allow these
foreign interests to flourish since they provided jobs in northern
Mexico and stimulated commerce.
U.S. reaction to the immigrants was different from that of Mexico. As the bustling southwest economy began to need laborers,
planters, miners, and railroad interests succeeded in overturning
the restrictive immigrant legislation of 1917; but when the Mexican
braceros were not needed or the fear took hold that they were
dangerous radicals, they were deported or excluded.
On the other hand, Carranza's strategy with emigrants was pragmatic and humanitarian. The Mexican president sought allies to
forestall U.S. intervention and to gain diplomatic recognition. For
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forestall U.S. intervention and to gain diplomatic recognition. For
this reason he backed the Plan de San Diego revolt when it suited
him, but he also aided the migrants so that they would not become
allied with reactionary plotters who wanted to destroy his regime
and its nationalist ideology. Moreover, Carranza could not abide
the harsh treatment that Mexicans normally underwent after leaving his country. To maintain economic recovery, Carranza discouraged further emigration, but he also aided those who had left
the country in demanding better working and living conditions in
the United States.
Within a decade, the border was transformed from an open frontier to something resembling a war zone. The relative peace that
characterized the border before 1900 evaporated as civil war, ethnic
revolts, and exploitation became frequent border scenes. Old prejudices and injustices fueled the conflict as both nations battled to
gain economic advantages and carry out wartime strategies. Temporarily, Mexicans, immigrants, and Mexican-Americans united to
defend the government in Mexico City against the status quo in
the Southwest, and the gulf separating Hispanics from Anglos was
probably wider than ever. Undoubtedly, during the Revolution,
the border was farther from cultural pluralism and political harmony than at any other time in its modern history. Carranza's
~order policy reflected his determination to improve the treatment
of Mexican immigrants and to strengthen the Mexican economy
within the context of his fierce nationalism. Carranza's diplomatic
and military triumphs along the northern frontier demonstrate that
he was a clever strategist and an able statesman who enjoyed mass
support to a greater extent than is commonly recognized.

NOTES
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